UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1997/941
1 December 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 1 DECEMBER 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a note verbale dated 18 November 1997 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates addressed to the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Abu Dhabi. It protests against the fact that, according to the evening newspaper Kayhan in its issue for 13 October 1997, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has given the name Tunb to an Iranian naval pilot vessel and, according to the Iranian newspaper Abrar in its issue for 20 October 1997, it has given the name Abu Musa to an Iranian naval pontoon. This is to be regarded as imposing an unlawful fait accompli and as an attempt to perpetuate the occupation of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, three islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates, and to bring them under Iranian sovereignty by use of force.

In this connection, the United Arab Emirates reaffirms its sovereignty over the islands in question. It once again affirms that it does not recognize any other sovereignty over the islands, and it reserves all of its rights with regard thereto.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad J. SAMHAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

97-34459 (E) 021297 021297

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Annex

Note verbale dated 18 November 1997 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates addressed to the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Abu Dhabi

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Abu Dhabi.

It would like to inform the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the fact that, according to the evening newspaper Kayhan in its issue for 13 October 1997, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has given the name Tunb to an Iranian naval pilot vessel and, according to the Iranian newspaper Abrar in its issue for 20 October 1997, has given the name Abu Musa to an Iranian naval pontoon is to be regarded as imposing an unlawful fait accompli and as an attempt to perpetuate the occupation of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, three islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates, and to bring them under Iranian sovereignty by use of force.

Accordingly, the Government of the United Arab Emirates strongly protests to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran against this unlawful action. It regards this and all previous measures taken by Iranian Governments on the three islands in question as unwarranted acts of provocation that do not confer any rights on the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to the islands and only serve to further undermine confidence between the two countries.

The United Arab Emirates reaffirms its sovereignty over the islands in question. It once again affirms that it does not recognize any other sovereignty over the islands, and it reserves all of its rights with regard thereto.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes this opportunity to convey to the Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/1997/942
2 December 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 DECEMBER 1997 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 661 (1990) CONCERNING THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith for the attention of the members of the Council the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1111 (1997). The report, covering the Committee's activities in relation to the implementation of the arrangements stipulated in Council resolution 986 (1995) prior to the end of the 180-day period after the date of entry into force of paragraph 1 of resolution 1111 (1997), was adopted by the Committee on 2 December 1997.

(Signed) António MONTEIRO
Chairman
Security Council Committee established
by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the
situation between Iraq and Kuwait

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Annex

Report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait on the implementation of the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 2, 6, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 986 (1995)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 1111 (1997) of 4 June 1997, in which the Council requested the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, in close coordination with the Secretary-General, to report to it prior to the end of the 180-day period on the implementation of the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 2, 6, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 986 (1995). The 180-day period after paragraph 1 of resolution 1111 (1997) came into force ends on 4 December 1997.

2. To date, the Committee has submitted three reports to the Security Council on the implementation of the arrangements set out in resolution 986 (1995), two during the first 180-day period (phase I) ending June 1997 (S/1997/213 and S/1997/417) and the third on 8 September 1997 at the end of the first 90-day period in phase II of the operation as extended by the Security Council in its resolution 1111 (1997) (S/1997/692).

II. EXPORT OF OIL FROM IRAQ

3. The export of petroleum from Iraq in phase II has proceeded with excellent cooperation among the overseers, the United Nations independent inspection agents (Saybolt), the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization and the national oil purchasers. In view of the delayed resumption in petroleum sales, the projected $500 million revenue shortfall in the 90-day revenue objective of $1.07 billion (including the pipeline fee) and the consequences for humanitarian supplies, the Security Council, in its resolution 1129 (1997) of 12 September 1997, decided to extend the first quarter from 90 days to 120 days and to limit the second quarter to 60 days. It has now been determined that the proceeds received from oil sales for the first quarter in phase II amount to $1.07 billion.

4. Thirty-three contracts, involving purchasers from 14 countries, have been reviewed and approved by the overseers in phase II (see appendix). The total quantity of oil approved for export under those contracts corresponds to approximately 126.8 million barrels for the 180 days. All contracts submitted employed the pricing mechanisms approved by the Committee on the recommendation of the overseers.

5. In the first quarter, 57 loadings, totalling 65.4 million barrels, were completed. In the second quarter, 54 liftings, totalling 56 million barrels, with an estimated value of $974 million, have been completed. Seven liftings remain for the second quarter. The letters of credit opened for each of the

liftings were confirmed by the overseers upon compliance with the terms and conditions of the contracts approved and consultations with the parties concerned. About 57 per cent of the liftings were made at Ceyhan in Turkey. The largest share of the volume lifted went to Europe. At current prices, total revenue projected for the 180-day period by lifting the remaining contract volumes is about $2.14 billion (including the pipeline fee).

6. The overseers have continued to advise and assist the Committee on the pricing mechanisms, contract approval and modifications, management of the 90-day revenue objective of $1.07 billion (including the pipeline fee) and other pertinent questions related to import and monitoring, under resolutions 986 (1995), 1111 (1997) and 1129 (1997), of each export of petroleum originating in Iraq. The overseers and the independent inspection agents (Saybolt) deployed to monitor oil loadings and transfers have worked closely to ensure the effective monitoring of the relevant oil installations as well as the liftings.

7. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the procedures of the Committee (S/1996/636), 237 national oil purchasers have been nominated from 40 countries who are authorized to communicate directly with the overseers.

8. Pursuant to paragraph 14 of the procedures of the Committee, the overseers have continued to report to it once a week on the contracts considered by them relating to the sale of petroleum originating in Iraq, including the cumulative quantity and approximate value of petroleum authorized for export. So far, 50 such reports have been submitted to the Committee.

III. EXPORT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO IRAQ

9. The processing of contracts for supplying humanitarian goods to Iraq remains the priority for the Committee in the second 180-day period of the operation under resolution 986 (1995) as extended by resolution 1111 (1997) (phase II). Humanitarian supplies to Iraq approved under resolution 986 (1995) (phase I) continue to reach Iraq. Owing to the delayed start in the sales of
um after the adoption of resolution 1111 (1997), humanitarian supplies
ed under phase II started to arrive in Iraq on 2 November 1997.

1 e approval process of phase II applications started on 11 September 1997, when the first application was received by the Committee. Since then, phase II has been running parallel to phase I. The categorized list of supplies and goods that accompanied the distribution plan for phase II (S/1997/606) was made available to the Committee in September 1997. It has subsequently been computerized and made available to interested Member States.

11. During phase II, the Committee held a number of informal meetings at an expert level to deal with issues arising from the processing of applications under phases I and II. At those meetings, members of the Committee discussed with the secretariat of the Committee questions related to the transition of the operation from phase I to phase II. On the basis of the suggestions by the secretariat and with a view to facilitating the preparation of a new orientation session to be held soon in order to brief interested delegations on certain practical aspects related to the implementation of resolutions 986 (1995) and

1111 (1997), Committee members exchanged views on questions pertaining to the practice of the secretariat in the processing of applications to send humanitarian supplies to Iraq under those resolutions.

12. As mentioned in the previous report of the Committee on the operation (S/1997/692), the Secretary-General, on 31 July 1997, approved the designation of Al-Walid at the Iraqi/Syrian border (facing Al-Tenf, Syrian Arab Republic) as a new entry point for the supply of humanitarian goods to Iraq under resolution 986 (1995). Subsequently, on 26 August 1997, 10 United Nations independent inspection agents from Lloyd's Register were deployed there to authenticate the arrival of humanitarian supplies to Iraq in accordance with paragraph 36 of the procedures of the Committee for the implementation of resolution 986 (1995). After becoming operational on 29 September 1997, the first consignments arrived at Al-Walid on 3 November 1997 and were authenticated the next day.

13. The authentication of the arrival of humanitarian supplies in Iraq by the United Nations independent inspection agents (Lloyd's Register) has been going on smoothly at all four entry points at Al-Walid, Trebil, Umm Qasr, and Zakho. The Iraqi authorities have accorded the independent agents full cooperation in their operation. As at 1 December 1997, 469 consignments of humanitarian supplies have been confirmed as having arrived in Iraq in total or in partial shipments.

14. As at 1 December 1997, the Committee has received 929 applications under phase I, 65 of which have subsequently been cancelled. Eight hundred fifty-four were circulated to Committee members for action. Of these, 778 have been approved, totalling approximately $1,218 million, and 31 have been placed on hold. Of the remaining 55, 45 have been blocked and 10 have not yet been circulated to Committee members because the secretariat is still waiting either for needed information from the applicant States or the accumulation of sufficient funds. Under the 13 per cent account, a cumulative total of 303 applications had been submitted under phase I as at 15 November 1997, of which 290 had been approved, with 13 pending.

15. Funds for exports to Iraq under resolution 1111 (1997) became available in the escrow account on 12 September 1997. As at 1 December 1997, the Committee has received 239 applications under phase II, 6 of which have subsequently been cancelled. One hundred forty-one were circulated to Committee members for action. Of these, 117 have been approved, totalling approximately $747.5 million, and 7 have been placed on hold. One has been blocked and 16 are awaiting decisions of the Committee since the time limit within which the Committee is expected to decide has not elapsed. Ninety-two have not yet been circulated to Committee members because the secretariat is still waiting for funds to become available or for required information from the applicant States. Under the 13 per cent account, 64 applications had been submitted under phase II as at 15 November 1997, and 51 of them had been approved.

IV. MATTERS RELATING TO THE KIRKUK-YUMURTALIK PIPELINE

16. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 986 (1995), on 25 September 1997 Turkey requested the Committee's approval for payments of the oil transportation fees due it during the first 90-day period of Iraq's oil exportation in phase II. Subsequently, a transfer of the agreed pipeline fee totalling $46,285,616.44 was effected with Turkey as the beneficiary.

17. As summarized in the Committee's previous report (S/1997/692), the Committee has received from Turkey, pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 986 (1995), two requests to supply parts and equipment for the repair and maintenance of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline system in Iraq. Both requests have been approved.

V. CONCLUSIONS

18. The Committee will continue to work for the smooth and effective implementation of the relevant arrangements under resolutions 986 (1995) and 1111 (1997). Issues with regard to the processing of applications for humanitarian supplies to Iraq will continue to be actively considered by the Committee on an ongoing basis. In this connection, the Committee wishes to express its appreciation to all parties concerned for their cooperation and contribution.

Appendix

Contractual volume by country (barrels)



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2 December 1997

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda item 61
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-second year

Letter dated 26 November 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 26 November 1997, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hüseyin E. ÇELEM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

97-34557 (E) 021297

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Annex

Letter dated 26 November 1997 from Mr. Aytuğ Plümer addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the statements made by the Greek Cypriot representative at the Third Committee on 17 and 19 November 1997, under agenda item 112 (b) and (c), in which unfounded allegations were levelled against my country. The same allegations were repeated by the representative of Greece at the said Committee.

Since the Greek Cypriot side and Greece are exploiting every opportunity to disseminate false propaganda in every international forum, where the Turkish Cypriot side is denied its lawful representation, I am compelled to respond to these allegations, once again, in writing.

The Greek Cypriot representative has tried to portray the question of Cyprus as one of human rights violations arising from the legal Turkish intervention of 1974 in the aftermath of a bloody coup d'état by Greece and its collaborators in Cyprus aimed at annexing the island to Greece. The Greek representative has made no mention of the 1963-1974 period during which even the most fundamental human rights of the Turkish Cypriot people, including their right to life, liberty and security, were grossly violated. During that period, the world witnessed unprecedented cruelty and violence which culminated in a large-scale ethnic cleansing operation that exacted a high toll on the Turkish Cypriot people. As from December 1963, hundreds of Turkish Cypriot civilians, including women, children and the elderly were murdered and thousands wounded by Greek Cypriot armed elements. The following excerpts from the world press attest to the cold-blooded massacres perpetrated by the Greek Cypriots:

> "We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last five days. We are the first Western reporters there and we have seen sights too frightful to be described in print and horrors so extreme that people seemed stunned beyond tears and reduced to a hysterical and mirthless giggle that is more terrible than tears."
>
> (Daily Express, 28 December 1963)

> "A few days ago, 1000 people lived here, in their solid, stone-built homes which hug the coast road to Kyrenia, 13 miles from Nicosia. Then in a night of terror 350 villagers - men, women and children - vanished. They were all Turks."
>
> (Daily Herald, 31 December 1963)

The periodic reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations bear solid testimony to the flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of Turkish Cypriots during this period. The Turkish Cypriots were forced to live under conditions which the Secretary-General referred to as a

"veritable siege" in one of his reports to the Security Council (see S/5950 dated 10 September 1964).

The question of displaced persons in Cyprus did not start in 1974, contrary to what the Greek Cypriot representative has indicated in his statement. During the Greek Cypriot onslaught which began in December 1963, 103 Turkish Cypriot villages were attacked and devastated (as recorded in the Ortega report issued after an extensive survey of the destroyed villages by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in May-July 1964), rendering nearly 30,000 Turkish Cypriots homeless refugees. Again in 1974, as a result of the Greek coup d'état and its aftermath, 65,000 Turkish Cypriots fled to the north, in the face of an impending massacre, to seek refuge in safer areas. The burden of responsibility for the population movements in Cyprus between 1963 and 1974 lies heavily upon the shoulders of the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece, which have jointly wrought havoc and destruction in the name of enosis (i.e., annexation of the island to Greece).

The question of displaced persons was settled by agreement between the two sides at the third round of the intercommunal talks held at Vienna between 31 July and 2 August 1975, whereby the two sides agreed on a voluntary (not forcible expulsion, as the Greek Cypriot representative alleges) regrouping of populations in their own respective territory, the Turkish Cypriots in the North and the Greek Cypriots in the South, paving the way for a bi-zonal settlement of the Cyprus question.

The Greek Cypriot representative has made false and misleading allegations about the living conditions of Greek Cypriots residing in the Karpaz peninsula in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Suffice it to say that the Turkish Cypriot authorities do not practice any discriminatory policy towards Greek Cypriots in this region and that their living standards are on a par with those of Turkish Cypriots in the area. The Turkish Cypriot authorities have already implemented a series of unilateral goodwill measures aimed at further improving the infrastructure and living standards in the Karpaz region. The Greek Cypriot population has unrestricted access to the health-care facilities in Northern Cyprus. They are free to visit the touristic and other areas open to the public. Greek Cypriot teachers attend to the education of Greek Cypriot children in the area, using books and literature supplied from Southern Cyprus. Two new teachers have been appointed to the primary school in the Karpaz area with the permission of the TRNC authorities. Greek Cypriots living in the TRNC are able to attend religious services in places of worship without hindrance. Some 1,000 Greek Cypriots are expected to cross over to the TRNC on 30 November to attend the religious ceremony at the Apostolos Andreas monastery.

On the other hand, the situation of Turkish Cypriots in South Cyprus is not even comparable to the normal living conditions enjoyed by the Greek Cypriots in the North. The few hundred Turkish Cypriots who chose to stay in the South after 1974 are faced with inhuman social, economic and racial discrimination. They live in residential areas which are plagued by poverty and unemployment. Their freedom of movement is severely restricted by the Greek Cypriot police for surveillance purposes.

The question of missing persons, which arose in December 1963 with the onslaught on the Turkish Cypriots, is still being exploited for propaganda purposes as if it has been an issue exclusively affecting Greek Cypriots since 1974. The Greek Cypriot administration refuses to disclose the list of Greek Cypriot casualties of the coup d'état of 15 July 1974 because concealing the truth from their own people and the international community serves their short-sighted political propaganda objectives. The statement of a former Greek Minister of Maritime Affairs, Mr. Evangelos Yannopoulos, as reported by the Greek Cypriot daily Eleftherotipia dated 7 April 1988, needs no further comment:

> "The two myths in Cyprus must be exposed as lies: The first myth being the case of missing persons, and the second being the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey. Those Greek Cypriots presented as missing persons are actually Greek Cypriot victims who were killed during the coup."

We hope that the Greek Cypriot side will cease to exploit this humanitarian problem at the expense of those on both sides who have lost loved ones.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ PLÜMER
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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Agenda item 61
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-second year

Letter dated 26 November 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 24 November 1997, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hüseyin E. ÇELEM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

97-34563 (E) 021297

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Annex

Letter dated 24 November 1997 from Mr. Aytuğ Plümer addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the statement made by the Greek Cypriot representative at the meeting of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) held on 14 November 1997 under agenda item 88 ("Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects"). The statement contains allegations that grossly distort the realities of Cyprus and demonstrates yet again that the Greek Cypriot side is more interested in generating rhetoric than seeking a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus dispute.

The Greek Cypriot representative, in a vain attempt to absolve the Greek Cypriot side from the responsibility of creating and perpetuating the conflict on the island, once again refers to the legitimate Turkish intervention in Cyprus as an "invasion" and "occupation". I wish to remind the Greek Cypriot representative that the only occupation in Cyprus is the 34-year-old usurpation and continued occupation by the Greek Cypriot side of the seat of government of the bi-communal partnership Republic of Cyprus established under the 1960 Treaties. It was the Greek Cypriot armed onslaught in December 1963 against the Turkish Cypriot people and the bi-communal order that led to division on the island when the Turkish Cypriot people were forced to live in enclaves, deprived of all basic necessities and fundamental human rights, for 11 years prior to the legitimate Turkish intervention of 1974. What has been called the "Green Line" was established in 1963 so as to provide protection for defenceless Turkish Cypriots.

The Greek Cypriot side also conveniently forgets to recall that on 15 July 1974 Greece and its collaborators on the island staged a bloody coup d'état in Cyprus aimed at the final extermination of the Turkish Cypriots in order to achieve enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece). In the face of this imminent danger, Turkey had no alternative but to exercise its rights and obligations set out by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and intervened militarily on 20 July 1974, averting the colonization of the island by Greece. Turkey's military presence on the island serves as an effective deterrent against the Greek-Greek Cypriot ambition of Hellenizing Cyprus and the potential for renewed aggression against the Turkish Cypriots, as occurred during the period 1963-1974.

The Greek Cypriot representative attempts to rewrite history by claiming that the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established in 1964 after the Greek Cypriot wing of the once bi-communal Republic of Cyprus invoked the assistance of the United Nations in 1963 when faced with the threat of "intervention by a more powerful neighbour". Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, UNFICYP was established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and dispatched to the island as a means of preventing the massacre of the Turkish Cypriot people by the Greek Cypriots.
Mr. George W. Ball, who was the United States Under-Secretary of State at the time and visited the island in February 1964, recalls in his memoirs how he

furiously told the then Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, that "the world is not going to stand idly by and let you turn this beautiful little island into your private abattoir" (The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 341). Furthermore, in stark contrast to the claims made by the Greek Cypriot representative, Mr. Ball recalls having reported the following to Washington at the time: "... The Greek Cypriots, I wrote, do not want a peacekeeping force; they just want to be left alone to kill Turkish Cypriots" (ibid., p. 345).

Evidently, the real lesson to be learned from the United Nations peacekeeping experience in Cyprus is that even when the Security Council mandates UNFICYP to "use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions", this cannot prove possible when one of the parties to that dispute usurps the seat of government and uses it as a means of persecuting its former partner. Furthermore, a political settlement can never be attained when the usurper regime acts to consolidate its illegal status rather than seeking a compromise which would entail sharing power with the very side it tried to subjugate by force of arms in December 1963.

As regards the Greek Cypriot representative's reference to the "demilitarization proposal" of the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, I wish to point out that it constitutes a contradiction in terms for the Greek Cypriot administration to pursue an intensive campaign of militarization in line with its policy of escalation and tension on the one hand, and pay lip service to demilitarization on the other. Ever since the inception of the so-called "joint defence doctrine" with Greece in 1993, the Greek Cypriot administration has undertaken an unprecedented build-up of arms and armed forces, including the purchase of the sophisticated S-300 missile system in contravention of successive Security Council resolutions on Cyprus. With the construction and inauguration of the military airbase in Paphos and the near completion of a naval base in Zyghi for use by the Greek armed forces, South Cyprus has effectively been converted into a military outpost of Greece.

The Greek Cypriot campaign of propaganda and defamation clearly indicates that the Greek Cypriot side is not interested in the resolution of the dispute but rather prefers the present state of affairs under which it is treated as the "Government of Cyprus" and sees the prospect of becoming a full member of the European Union in the name of "Cyprus". Those parties interested in a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus dispute must accord equal treatment to the two sides in Cyprus, if ever the Greek Cypriots are to have an incentive to seek a negotiated settlement.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ PLÜMER
Representative
Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1997/945
2 December 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 2 DECEMBER 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that on 28 and 29 November 1997, United States aircraft continued to violate Iraq's airspace, carrying out reconnaissance and engaging in acts of provocation as set forth in the annex hereto.

You are requested to intervene with a view to putting a stop to these actions, which pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and are a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of the provisions of international law.

These actions terrorize the civilian population and cause damage to public and private property. Iraq reaffirms its right to seek compensation for the damage being inflicted on the Iraqi people and the Iraqi State by these actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Details concerning violations committed between 28 and 29 November 1997

1. In the northern region, 46 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Mosul, Amadiyah, Aqrah, Zakho, Irbil, Tall Afar, Baibo, Kalik and Ain Safni.

2. In the southern region, 299 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Nasiriyah, Samawah, Artawi, Achbija, Jalibah, Afak, Salman, Bussayyah, Qurnah, Chabaish, Chinafiya, Basra, Chathatha, Lasaf, Diwaniyah, Najaf, Rifa'i and Rumaythah.

3. At 1055 hours on 28 November 1997, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region before heading off in the direction of Kuwait at 1218 hours.

4. At 1510 hours on 24 November 1997, the United States air force violated Iraqi airspace over the area of Umm Qasr.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/1997/946
2 December 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 2 DECEMBER 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CHILE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Chile to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to his note dated 16 October 1997 regarding the situation in Sierra Leone, has the honour to inform him of the following:

Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1132 (1997) adopted on 8 October 1997, the Government of Chile has decided to suspend the granting of visas to members of the military junta and adult members of their families and is awaiting the list of persons whose entry or transit is to be prevented, which is to be drawn up by the Sanctions Committee established by the same resolution (para. 10 (f)).

At the same time, the Government of Chile is in the process of promulgating the necessary measures within its own domestic legislation in order to implement the measures set forth by the Security Council in paragraph 6 of resolution 1132 (1997).

97-34651 (E) 021297 021297

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NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1997/947
2 December 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 26 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MONACO TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the Principality of Monaco to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to inform him that, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997, the Government of His Serene Highness shall, within the context of the international agreements which it has concluded, endeavour to implement, without reservation, the provisions outlined in paragraph 5 concerning the suspension of the granting of visas to members of the military junta and adult members of their families.

In addition, the competent Monégasque authorities intend, under the same conditions, to abide by the provisions of paragraph 6 of the said resolution concerning the prohibition of the sale of certain products.

97-34669 (E) 021297 021297

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

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4 December 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH, FRENCH AND RUSSIAN

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions concerning the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, in particular its resolutions 1105 (1997) of 9 April 1997 and 1110 (1997) of 28 May 1997,

Recalling also its resolutions 1101 (1997) of 28 March 1997 and 1114 (1997) of 19 June 1997, which expressed the Council's concern over the situation in Albania,

Reaffirming its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,

Reiterating its appreciation for the important role played by the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in contributing to the maintenance of peace and stability and paying tribute to its personnel in the performance of their mandate,

Reiterating its call on the Governments of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to implement in full their Agreement of 8 April 1996 (S/1996/291, annex), in particular regarding the demarcation of their mutual border,

Welcoming the phased reduction and restructuring of UNPREDEP troop strength which has taken place pursuant to its resolution 1110 (1997),

Taking note of the letter of 31 October 1997 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the Secretary-General, requesting the extension of the mandate of UNPREDEP (S/1997/838, annex),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 20 November 1997 and the recommendations contained therein (S/1997/911),

Taking note of the Secretary-General's observations that there have been a number of positive developments in the overall situation in the area, in particular the stabilization of the situation in Albania, but that peace and

stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to depend largely on developments in other parts of the region,

Bearing in mind the intention of Member States and interested organizations to consider actively the instituting of possible alternatives to UNPREDEP,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNPREDEP for the final period until 31 August 1998, with the withdrawal of the military component immediately thereafter;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 1 June 1998 on the modalities of the termination of UNPREDEP, including practical steps for the complete withdrawal of the military component immediately after 31 August 1998, and to submit recommendations on the type of international presence that would be most appropriate for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia after 31 August 1998;

3. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/949
3 December 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 DECEMBER 1997 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 661 (1990) CONCERNING THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith for the attention of the members of the Council the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

The report was approved by the Committee on 3 December 1997.

(Signed) António MONTEIRO
Chairman
Security Council Committee established
by resolution 661 (1990) concerning
the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

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Annex

Report of the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f) of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

1. The present report is submitted by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, in accordance with paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 approved by the Security Council in its resolution 700 (1991) of 17 June 1991 (S/22660, annex).

2. Under paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines, the Committee is required to report at 90-day intervals to the Security Council on the implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq contained in the relevant resolutions of the Council. The present report is the twenty-sixth report submitted under the above-mentioned guidelines.

3. By paragraph 12 of the guidelines, all States are requested to report to the Committee any information that may have come to their attention relating to possible violations of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq committed by other States or foreign nationals. During the period under review, no information as requested has been brought to the attention of the Committee.

4. In accordance with paragraphs 13 and 15 of the guidelines, all States and international organizations are required to consult the Committee on the question of whether certain items fall within the provisions of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), as well as in cases relating to dual-use or multiple-use items, that is, items meant for civilian use but with potential for diversion or conversion to military use. During the period covered by the report, no States or international organizations have consulted the Committee on these questions.

5. By paragraph 14 of the guidelines, international organizations are requested to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring full compliance with the arms and related sanctions against Iraq, including providing to the Committee any relevant information that may come to their attention. During the period under review, no information as requested by paragraph 14 of the guidelines has been received by the Committee.

6. The Committee will continue its efforts to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it. Since the last report of the Secretary-General, dated 4 December 1991 (S/22884/Add.2), no further communications have been received from Member States pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 700 (1991).

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/950
3 December 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 DECEMBER 1997 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 3 December 1997, which I have received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the Director General's letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

97-34978 (E) 041297

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Annex

Letter dated 3 December 1997 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

I refer to the annex to the letter circulated as document S/1997/930 on 28 November 1997, which contains Iraq's comments on the 24 November Security Council briefing by the leader of the International Atomic Energy Agency Action Team. The briefing covered the status of five matters described in paragraph 75 of the fourth consolidated progress report of IAEA (S/1997/779, appendix). The notes of that briefing, a copy of which is attached, were provided to the Council at the request of its members (see appendix).

In document S/1997/930, Iraq concluded that the matters in question required no further clarification. However, Iraq provided no basis to support its conclusion. It is for that reason that an IAEA team intends to visit Iraq during the third week of December in an effort to clarify the five matters. The team is also expected to address other important verification matters, such as the use of fixed-wing aircraft in Iraq.

The Agency considers that resolution of the five matters would provide further assurance that the technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme is comprehensive and that there are no activities that are outside that picture. Further, a fuller understanding of the technical achievements of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme will enable the Agency to tailor its ongoing monitoring and verification activities appropriately.

I would be grateful if you could bring the present letter to the attention of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed EL BARADEI

nuclear programme and to take measures to remove all physical evidence of that programme.

7. As I have stated, the existence of the "Governmental Committee" was declared by the Iraqi counterpart during the May 1997 presentation, and the senior counterpart, Dr. Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, the former head of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, was asked by me to clarify its function further.

8. Dr. Jaffar responded that since the Committee was under the chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, he would have to seek clearance before responding. Since that time Iraq has chosen to take the line that the Committee, the existence of which Iraq voluntarily declared in May 1997, did not and does not exist.

9. The reluctance of IAEA to accept this contradiction is because such a committee might be the policy and decision organ of a contemporary concealment mechanism.

2. External assistance to Iraq's clandestine programme

10. The so-called Haider House farm documentation cache contained a collection of several hundred pages of information regarding the involvement of Iraq's general intelligence service, the Mukhabarat, in Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. As recorded in the IAEA report (S/1997/779, appendix), the Iraqi counterpart initially denied the role of the Mukhabarat, but when faced with copies of Iraq's own documentation showing the role played by the Mukhabarat in clandestine procurement, he stated that it had constituted a very small component of the total petrochemical-3 (PC-3) procurement project. The procurement aspect has essentially been clarified, although some questions remain as to the fate of specialized batteries, procured through the Mukhabarat, for potential use in the firing circuit of a nuclear weapon.

11. The Mukhabarat files also contained some information regarding unsolicited offers of assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme that were judged to warrant further investigation. Iraq has long maintained a strategy of avoiding volunteering information but rather limiting the scope of information it provides to its estimate of the extent of our knowledge. It was therefore decided to ask Iraq to provide information on all significant offers of assistance to its clandestine nuclear programme.

12. Discussions along those lines were initiated in 1996 when it was volunteered, by Dr. Halim Al Hajjaj, the Vice-Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), that he maintained a file of such instances, which he offered to make available to IAEA in the near future. Subsequent discussions on this topic were usually met with statements by Dr. Al Hajjaj that the person responsible for that file was variously "on vacation" or "on sick leave" or otherwise unavailable. When the matter was addressed during the July 1997 visit, by the technical team, the team was advised that, for no apparent reasons, the file had been destroyed. Nonetheless, the team entered into discussion with Dr. Hajjaj and Dr. Jaffar, but neither of those officials volunteered anything of note.

13. The topic remained at an impasse until it was raised with Iraq's Minister of Culture and Information, Dr. Humam Ghaffour, during his participation in the General Conference of IAEA, held in Vienna from 29 September to 3 October 1997. Again, IAEA attempted to convince the Iraqi counterpart that information volunteered was of much greater significance than information extracted, but Dr. Ghaffour reiterated Iraq's request to have specific case-by-case information. After several discussions, IAEA eventually provided to Dr. Ghaffour, as an example of the information available to IAEA, a letter from an official (coded 15B) to his IAEC counterpart (coded 15S) - the same two respective officials who had corresponded on clandestine procurement matters. The sample letter provided to Dr. Ghaffour indicates that the Mukhabarat were confident that the source of assistance was valid and worth pursuing. Although notations on the letter show IAEC to have been more circumspect, they include a request from IAEC that the Mukhabarat endeavour to obtain samples from the source.

14. I have previously pointed out to the Security Council the serious challenge that would face the ongoing monitoring and verification plan of IAEA if Iraq were to acquire weapon-usable nuclear material directly. It is this challenge that makes it essential to resolve all matters involving potential external assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. In his letter to me received on 9 October 1997, Dr. Ghaffour stated that he had "already carried out urgent preliminary contacts on this matter" and recorded the need for some extra time to be able to provide something of substance. Dr. Ghaffour recorded his assurance that Iraq was taking the matter seriously.

3. The motives behind the actions ascribed to the late Lt.-Gen. Hussein Kamel that resulted in the concealment of the cache of documentation, material and equipment "discovered" at the Haider House farm

15. It is also appropriate to recall the text at the end of paragraph 14 of the IAEA report (S/1997/779, appendix), which states, in relation to the May 1997 visit by the technical team, that it had also been expected to obtain an understanding of the objectives, scope and duration of the assumed attempts by the late "Hussein Kamel and his group" (a phrase introduced by Mr. Tariq Aziz) to sustain the nuclear programme beyond April 1991.

16. Paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) opens with the decision that Iraq must unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above. Contrary to the obligations it accepted on 6 April 1991, Iraq was, at least until 20 August 1995, concealing and retaining some proscribed items. The circumstances raise a number of questions:

(a) When, if ever, was Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme abandoned?

(b) Did the items stored at the Haider House farm and those reportedly destroyed at the farm near Abu Grahib comprise all of the illegally retained items or were they merely a collection of unwanted duplicate documents and low-

value equipment and materials? Or was it a collection that could be offered up to UNSCOM and IAEA to satisfy questions that were likely to arise from their respective discussions with Hussein Kamel, thereby making it possible for Iraq to retain more valuable items?

(c) What other reason could there have been for the retention of proscribed items other than an intention to reconstitute the programme?

(d) When, if ever, was the ambition to reconstitute the programme abandoned?

17. Much of the discussions with the Iraqi counterpart in 1997 were directed towards the exploration of these questions in order to determine what, if any, information was available to support a conclusion that the programme had been abandoned or at least substantially interrupted. Much useful information has been provided by Iraq detailing the dissolution of the PC-3 programme and the reassignment of its constituent departments to non-proscribed activities. However, Iraq's reluctance to address the "Hussein Kamel" question is problematic.

4. The inclusion in Iraq's "full, final and complete declaration" of a summary of the practical and theoretical achievements of its clandestine nuclear programme

18. This matter was first raised with Iraq in May 1997. Iraq has chosen to avoid properly responding to the request on the grounds that it fears that such a summary would provoke extended discussion, which could further delay the Security Council's assessment of its compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991). Iraq has informally offered to produce such a summary after, to quote Iraq, "the nuclear file is closed".

5. The provision of the promised written description of Iraq's post-war procurement system

19. This information was requested of Iraq in a constructive attempt to avoid confusion between Iraq's "un-advertised" procurement system for non-proscribed equipment and materials that are eventually declared to IAEA, and the concerns about Iraq's clandestine procurement of proscribed, or undeclared, dual-use equipment and materials.

20. The information so far provided by Iraq is incomplete, but the provision of the missing information should be a simple administrative matter. This is not a matter of major significance.

21. In conclusion, I would once again refer to paragraph 83 of the IAEA report (S/1997/779, appendix), in which it is stated that IAEA was not "closing the books" on its investigation of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and would continue to exercise its right to investigate any aspect of that programme, in particular through the follow-up of any new information developed by IAEA or

provided by Member States and assessed by IAEA to warrant further investigation, and to destroy, remove or render harmless any proscribed items discovered through such investigations.

22. I apologize for the lengthy nature of this briefing and thank you for your attention.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/951
4 December 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and in particular its resolutions 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, 1111 (1997) of 4 June 1997 and 1129 (1997) of 12 September 1997,

Convinced of the need as a temporary measure to continue to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people until the fulfilment by Iraq of the relevant resolutions, including notably resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, allows the Council to take further action with regard to the prohibitions referred to in resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, in accordance with the provisions of those resolutions,

Convinced also of the need for equitable distribution of humanitarian relief to all segments of the Iraqi population throughout the country,

Welcoming the report submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 1111 (1997) (S/1997/935) and his intention to submit a supplementary report, as well as the report submitted in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 1111 (1997) by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990 (S/1997/942),

Noting with concern that, despite the ongoing implementation of resolutions 986 (1995) and 1111 (1997), the population of Iraq continues to face a serious nutritional and health situation,

Determined to avoid any further deterioration of the current humanitarian situation,

Noting with appreciation the recommendation of the Secretary-General that the Council re-examine the adequacy of the revenues provided by resolution 986 (1995) and consider how best to meet the priority humanitarian requirements of the Iraqi people, including the possibility of increasing those revenues,

Noting also with appreciation the Secretary-General's intention to include in his supplementary report recommendations on ways to improve the processing and supply of humanitarian goods under resolution 986 (1995),

Welcoming the efforts made by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to refine and clarify its working procedures and encouraging the Committee to go further in that direction in order to expedite the approval process,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that the provisions of resolution 986 (1995), except those contained in paragraphs 4, 11 and 12, shall remain in force for another period of 180 days beginning at 00.01 hours, Eastern Standard Time, on 5 December 1997;

2. Further decides that the provisions of the distribution plan in respect of goods purchased in accordance with resolution 1111 (1997) shall continue to apply to foodstuffs, medicine and health supplies purchased in accordance with this resolution pending the Secretary-General's approval of a new distribution plan, to be submitted by the Government of Iraq before 5 January 1998;

3. Further decides to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of the implementation of this resolution 90 days after the entry into force of paragraph 1 above and again prior to the end of the 180-day period, on receipt of the reports referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 below, and expresses its intention, prior to the end of the 180-day period, to consider favourably renewal of the provisions of this resolution, provided that the reports referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 below indicate that those provisions are being satisfactorily implemented;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council 90 days after the date of entry into force of paragraph 1 above, and again prior to the end of the 180-day period, on the basis of observation by United Nations personnel in Iraq, and on the basis of consultations with the Government of Iraq, on whether Iraq has ensured the equitable distribution of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs, financed in accordance with paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 986 (1995), including in his reports any observations he may have on the adequacy of the revenues to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs, and on Iraq's capacity to export sufficient quantities of petroleum and petroleum products to produce the sum referred to in paragraph 1 of resolution 986 (1995);

5. Requests the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), in close coordination with the Secretary-General, to report to the Council 90 days after the date of entry into force of paragraph 1 above and again prior to the end of the 180-day period on the implementation of the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 2, 6, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 986 (1995);

6. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to submit a supplementary report, and expresses its willingness, in the light of his recommendations, to find ways of improving the implementation of the humanitarian programme and to take such action over additional resources as needed to meet priority humanitarian requirements of the Iraqi people, as well as to consider an extension of the time-frame for the implementation of this resolution;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to submit his supplementary report to the Council no later than 30 January 1998;

8. Stresses the need to ensure respect for the security and safety of all persons appointed by the Secretary-General for the implementation of this resolution in Iraq;

9. Requests the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to continue, in close coordination with the Secretary-General, to refine and clarify working procedures in order to expedite the approval process and to report to the Council no later than 30 January 1998;

10. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/952
4 December 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 4 DECEMBER 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of Iraq's airspace by United States aircraft continued during the period from 30 November to 2 December 1997 and that the aircraft in question carried out reconnaissance and engaged in acts of provocation, as set forth in the annex hereto.

Your intervention is requested with a view to bringing a halt to actions that, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq.

These actions continue to alarm the civilian population and to cause serious damage to private and public property. The Republic of Iraq affirms its right to seek legal compensation for the damage being inflicted on the Iraqi people and the Iraqi State by these actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Violations of Iraq's airspace and damage caused, 30 November-2 December 1997

1. In the northern region 24 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following cities and towns: Dohuk, Mosul, Amadiyah, Aqrah, Zakho, Irbil and Tall Afar.

2. In the southern region 177 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Nasiriyah, Samawah, Artawi, Ushbayjah, Jalibah, Afak, Salman, Busayyah, Qurnah, Chabaish, Shinafiyah, Kut, Nu'maniyah, Ali al-Sharqi, Ali al-Gharbi, Rifa'i and Rumaythah.

3. At 1237 hours on 25 November 1997 United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr area.

4. At 0755 hours on 30 November 1997 a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region. At 1005 hours it headed towards Kuwaiti airspace.

5. At 1018 hours on 1 December 1997 a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region. At 1250 hours it headed towards Kuwaiti airspace.

6. At 0910 hours on 2 December 1997 a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region. At 1218 hours it headed towards Kuwaiti airspace.

7. At 1105 hours on 2 December 1997 a formation of two United States aircraft broke the sound barrier over the city of Najaf.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1997/953
4 December 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION FOR EASTERN SLAVONIA, BARANJA AND WESTERN SIRMIUM

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the request of the Security Council expressed in the statement of its President of 20 October 1997 (S/PRST/1997/48) that I report on all aspects relevant to the peaceful reintegration of the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (hereafter referred to as the region) by the beginning of December. It covers the steps taken in this regard since my last report dated 2 October 1997 (S/1997/767). This report also contains my recommendations for the future role of the United Nations in the region.

II. PROGRESS ON REINTEGRATION

2. In the statement of its President of 20 October, the Security Council welcomed several recent positive actions by the Government of Croatia and called on it to make further progress on outstanding areas on an urgent basis to comply fully with its obligations and to create the conditions for a successful completion of the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). During the reporting period, the Government of Croatia has shown more political will to complete reintegration successfully and has increased its efforts to meet its obligations. Important progress has been made, although not all obligations have been fulfilled. Some commitments clearly cannot be fully implemented within the two-year transitional period envisaged in the Basic Agreement of 12 November 1995 (S/1995/951, annex), and Croatian performance in some other areas can only be evaluated with the passage of time.

3. It should be recalled that UNTAES was established by the Security Council by its resolution 1037 (1996) of 15 January 1996, in response to the request of the parties to the Basic Agreement for an international force to maintain peace and security and to assist in the implementation of the Basic Agreement during a transitional period of a maximum of two years. The transitional period will end on 15 January 1998.

4. The major tasks of UNTAES were to assist in the demilitarization of the region; to facilitate, together with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the voluntary and safe return of refugees and displaced persons; to reintegrate civil administration and public services; to establish a temporary police force; to cooperate with the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; to organize elections; to monitor respect for the highest standards of human rights; and to promote an atmosphere of confidence among all local residents.

5. A review of the past two years shows that the success of UNTAES in the entire reintegration process is a positive precedent for peace throughout the former Yugoslavia. UNTAES has provided the necessary stability to enable Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to normalize their relations and enter into increasingly cooperative bilateral agreements, including a "soft border" regime and the re-establishment of normal commercial and traffic links between them. This is essential to the full economic development of the Danube border area. UNTAES has also ensured that developments in its area did not have a negative effect on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

6. Within the UNTAES area, there has been no large outflow of new refugees from the region and reintegration has been peaceful. Demilitarization was completed on 20 June 1996. A Transitional Police Force was established on 1 July 1996. The political and institutional framework for the reintegration of civil administration and public services was finalized. Local and regional elections were conducted successfully on 13 and 14 April 1997. Overall, the concept of two-way return of displaced persons and refugees was demonstrated in practice through the latter part of 1997, when some 6,000 Croats and 9,000 Serbs returned to their original homes. This is a major achievement, which two years ago many thought unlikely to happen in this time-frame. Close cooperation with the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has resulted in the successful exhumation of the Ovcara mass grave site and the arrest of an indicted war criminal. Evidence of the maintenance of local confidence was shown by the relatively small number of people (approximately 10 per cent of an estimated population of 130,000) who have chosen to emigrate from Croatia.

7. In order to provide reassurance and to prepare the local population for the full transfer of authority, UNTAES, throughout its mandate, has pursued a policy of negotiating public agreements with the Government of Croatia on the post-UNTAES implementation of its commitments and guarantees. A list of the 27 agreements of continuing validity, current as at 27 November, appears in annex I. Taken together with the provisions of the Croatian Constitution, those agreements, for which the Government of Croatia has made itself internationally accountable, provide a comprehensive political and institutional framework of guarantees, which, if fully implemented, will allow the people of the region to exercise freely their rights and obligations as equal citizens of Croatia. Their implementation depends on the political will of the Government, as well as on the wisdom and energy of the Serb political leadership. While at times there has been intransigence, obstruction or inertia from each party, over the past 22 months much of this resistance has been overcome, cooperation has been established and implementation of commitments has progressed. As reported below, by late November, notable improvements in Croatian cooperation and performance were evident in practically every key area.

National reconciliation

8. National reconciliation is the essential factor in the ultimate success of peaceful reintegration. On 2 October, following persistent encouragement by the Transitional Administrator, the Government adopted a comprehensive programme of national reconciliation and, on 9 October, it appointed a multi-ethnic national Board for the Realization of the Programme on the Establishment of Confidence, Acceleration of Returns and Normalization of Life, chaired by the President's Deputy Chief of Staff, to implement the programme by working through regional, municipal and local reconciliation committees. The programme calls for greater tolerance in all aspects of life and aims at facilitating the two-way return of displaced persons.

9. The Board has acted with energy and commitment. It has initiated meetings with national media representatives, religious leaders and non-governmental organizations to urge moderation and support for reconciliation. There has been a welcome improvement in media coverage of Serbs in Croatia. Two thirds of the local reconciliation committees have now been established. UNTAES, for its part, has contributed to reconciliation by organizing several professional reconciliation and conflict-resolution seminars with international donor support.

Establishment of local government administration

10. Since October, intensive efforts have been made by the two main Croat and Serb political parties to establish fully functioning local municipalities. Constructive initiatives include the establishment of offices in Vukovar for senior Serb and Croat officials, the opening of transit apartments in Vukovar to enable officials to live and work in the region and the successful holding of the third session of the Vukovar city assembly on 23 October after months of discord. The dismissal of a powerful but obstructive local county head has sent the clearest message to all local Croat officials to implement government policy. Instructions have been issued, but not yet fully implemented, for the dissolution of all "in exile" institutions.

11. However, the functioning of local government remains incomplete in important financial and legal areas: most municipalities cannot provide basic communal services because they have not received sufficient funds; only half of them have finalized plans for economic reconstruction; and the boundaries of the new municipalities drawn before the April elections have not been legally recognized, creating doubts as to their existence after the end of UNTAES. These difficulties can be solved quickly by government action; others, such as the smooth functioning of the power-sharing agreement between the major Croat and Serb political parties and the perception of political marginalization by many Serb local officials, will require time and reconciliation to take root.

Establishment of political institutions

12. The effective performance of Serb representatives in Croatian institutions in the post-UNTAES period will be crucial to the welfare of their constituents. The framework for comprehensive Serb representation comprising the Joint Council of Municipalities, the Independent Serb Democratic Party, the Serb National

Council and the four Assistant Ministers and two Senior Advisers, has been in place for some months. Local Serb representatives have become progressively more active but their effectiveness is hampered by a lack of skills, finance and support. The Joint Council of Municipalities has not yet received promised government funding and has not met with President Franjo Tudjman, as requested by them, in accordance with the guarantees contained in the letter of the Government of Croatia of 13 January 1997 (see S/1997/27, annex). The Serb Assistant Ministers are showing the benefits of international training programmes. Full effectiveness of Serb representatives will require goodwill and patience from the Croatian authorities, determination by the Serbs themselves and assistance from the international community in practical training and acquisition of skills.

13. Serb performance in planning for the long-term establishment of local Serb-language media has been disappointing. It was finally left to UNTAES to negotiate an agreement to allow continued broadcasting by four local Serb radio stations and for a daily television news programme, for which international assistance is available. It is now up to the local authorities to complete the final arrangements with Croatian State Radio and Television.

Integration of public services and enterprises

14. With very few exceptions, in which technical negotiations are well advanced, all public services and enterprises have been reintegrated. Ministries have generally complied with commitments to proportional representation in employment, although state enterprises at all levels have been slow and sometimes unwilling to issue permanent work contracts to Serbs. Some municipalities, especially those "in exile", have also been unwilling to fulfil employment commitments. A severance package has been agreed for eligible former employees not hired as Croatian civil servants.

15. Recent progress has been made in the difficult areas of reintegration of the health and education sectors. On 15 November, the Minister of Health agreed to provide short-term contracts of one year to those Serb medical personnel who must pass state medical examinations prior to receiving permanent contracts. In conjunction with the Ministry of Science and Technology it was also agreed that Croatia would meet the costs of the "nostrification" process required for recognition of other qualifications and that the process would be completed by no later than 10 January 1998. The Minister of Health has also consented to provide medical services to all residents of the region regardless of whether or not they are in possession of Croatian health cards. It remains to be seen whether this will be fully respected for refugees and those denied Croatian citizenship. Serbs are also concerned that proportional representation in senior posts has not been achieved and that a planned major downsizing of medical staff will be implemented in a discriminatory manner.

16. The ability of Serb citizens to educate their children in Serb language and culture will be a primary determinant of their willingness to stay and of Croatia's commitment to international standards of minority rights. It is deeply regrettable that implementation of the agreements on education has been unsatisfactory and has caused local anxiety and ferment. Only since mid-November did implementation begin of agreements on the use of minority

languages, allocation of principals' positions, the renewal of contracts for teachers whose credentials have not yet been validated and the delivery of Cyrillic textbooks. The Government of Croatia is encouraged to pay special attention to this still sensitive area.

Equal treatment in the provision of government services and benefits

17. After six years of ethnic conflict, damage to infrastructure and economic isolation, the immediate requirement for adequate social welfare services in the region is substantial. Some 13,000 residents now regularly receive full or partial pensions, but approximately 2,400 applications are still pending. Recent commitments to the effect that displaced persons could apply for and receive pensions and social welfare benefits in the region and that the period since 1991 would be considered pensionable should, if fully applied, resolve many problems. Availability of social welfare assistance is improving slowly. Beneficiaries have begun to collect a small one-time emergency payment pending the determination of their regular monthly benefits, which is awaiting new legislation to be implemented in January 1998. Unemployment benefits remain problematic. Owing to stringent regulations, only about 80 individuals have qualified for unemployment benefits in a region of massive unemployment. None have been paid yet.

Economic reintegration

18. UNTAES has achieved the institutional economic reintegration of the region, but for technical, legal and possibly political reasons, there has been no progress on economic revitalization. Except for agriculture, which is hampered by mine infestation, the economy is stagnant; unemployment is rampant and formerly socially owned enterprises are inefficient. The direct costs of repairing war damage, estimated at $1.2 billion, are beyond the immediate resources of the Government. Uncommitted international pledges of $38 million remain to be fulfilled and the Government has yet to develop an economic package to encourage investment and to extend credit programmes to Serbs in the region, including utilizing funds already provided for that purpose by an international donor. The privatization process, which has taken place in the rest of Croatia over the past five years, is just beginning amidst concern based on recent evidence that economic rationalization in both state and private enterprises will be applied in a discriminatory manner against Serbs. As privatization proceeds, Croatian businesses should bear in mind the many economic advantages of a multi-ethnic workforce in this border region.

Return of displaced persons and refugees

19. Croatian statistics show that some 9,000 Serbs and 6,000 Croats have returned to their homes throughout Croatia since April. No violent incidents have occurred in return areas since May, but the economic and social situation of returnees is grim. The pace of future movements is inhibited by three main factors: legal and financial obstacles to the recovery of property; unrealistic government deadlines for Serb applications for reconstruction assistance and delays in government funding for reconstruction of Serb houses; and the uncertain economic and social situation in areas of potential return. In addition, difficult winter conditions will mean that the next period of major

returns will not occur until the spring of 1998. The work of UNHCR in cooperation with UNTAES has been instrumental in assisting the Government on the issue of two-way returns. The continued role of UNHCR in the Joint Working Group on Returns, its support activities to the displaced population and its direct assistance to the government authorities is essential to the realization of the principles of the Basic Agreement.

20. The Government of Croatia has not yet responded to the repeated calls by the Security Council to remove legal obstacles to returns. Consequently, no long-term mechanisms have been established so far for returns to occupied homes. Although specific articles of the Law on Temporary Takeover of Property were recently declared unconstitutional, the law remains in effect and municipal authorities have not received instructions on implementing new procedures. Analysis of the proposed changes to the law gives no assurance that Croat and Serb displaced persons will receive equal treatment. There has been no resolution of the problem of restoration of lost tenancy rights in socially owned apartments in other parts of Croatia and the Government of Croatia has not presented a plan detailing options, as guaranteed in the Basic Agreement, for those Serb displaced persons who wish to receive just compensation or to remain in the region in accordance with their fundamental human rights.

Human rights

21. In relation to human rights, there is evidence that Serbs, in particular displaced persons, continue to be subject to administrative discrimination. Often this is manifested at the local level by officials who ignore or are unaware of government policy, resulting in obstacles in areas such as pensions, social welfare, treatment during the reconstruction of housing and health care. Such obstacles are often overcome with the help of UNTAES personnel, but they suggest a pattern, initially, of arbitrary decisions and deliberate misinformation by local officials. The Government must ensure that its decisions and policies are communicated and implemented at all administrative levels. In several reported cases, officers of the Transitional Police Force have participated in harassment or failed to provide adequate protection to Serbs under harassment. The Government's response to complaints of police misconduct has at times been disappointing.

22. Over 145,000 citizenship papers and 126,000 passports have been issued to residents in the region. Some 900 appeals against denials of citizenship have been pending for months in the Administrative Court; there has been no progress in those cases, thus reducing confidence in this legal recourse. These denials, based mostly on residency rules and possible "pending criminal proceedings" (many of which refer to crimes subject to the Amnesty Law), are yet to be resolved efficiently and fairly by Croatian authorities.

Reintegration of the judiciary

23. By a directive issued on 29 May, the Transitional Administrator ordered the region's judiciary to apply Croatian law for all new cases as from 1 June 1997. Building on that directive, UNTAES and the Minister of Justice of Croatia on 30 September signed a declaration fully establishing the Croatian judiciary in the region. Under that agreement, at least 40 per cent of all judges and other

judicial personnel must be Serbs. The Government of Croatia has begun to comply satisfactorily with those undertakings. Meanwhile, the Bar Association of Croatia has readmitted three of the five Serb lawyers in the region eligible to practise law in Croatia.

Amnesty law

24. The application of the Amnesty Law is a cause for anxiety to many Serbs as the Government of Croatia has not met its obligations to reduce public concern by concluding investigations of alleged serious crimes against international humanitarian law with the participation of the United Nations and local Serbs. The Osijek County Court alone has stated that there may be as many as 4,000 cases that need to be reviewed before amnesty can be confirmed. The fairness of trials, especially of those charged with war crimes, is in question. In several cases monitored by UNTAES there was little or no evidence produced by the prosecution of the defendant's involvement in specific offences and the judge did not appear to be impartial.

Conscription

25. There is deep concern in the region that the Ministry of Defence appears to be looking for technical loopholes to avoid its clear commitment in the Croatian letter of 13 January 1997 (S/1997/27, annex) to defer the draft for a minimum period of two years for Serbs from the region. In recent weeks several Serb residents, including displaced persons, have received military call-up notices. The clear meaning of article 10 of the Croatian letter is that all Serbs who lived in the region during the transitional administration will be exempt from military service for a "period of two years from the end of the UNTAES mandate". Any other policy is likely to act as a serious deterrent to return and would contradict the spirit of the national programme on reconciliation. Croatian Serb parliamentarians and the Joint Council of Municipalities have suggested that the Government of Croatia endorse its previous commitment to a liberal policy waiving military service for all residents of the region for the next two to four years.

Maintenance of public safety and security

26. The Transitional Police Force of 1,785 police officers comprises 895 Serbs, 837 Croats and 53 members of other ethnic communities. Inter-ethnic cooperation has improved and there are increased signs that Serbs are fully included in all aspects of police work, although there is only limited fraternization. Serb officers continue to be apprehensive about their personal future and work prospects once the Transitional Police Force is integrated into the Croatian police. The level of formal training and professionalism of many officers must be improved: nearly all Serb police officers require additional basic police training and Croat officers show a need for greater inter-ethnic understanding and human rights and community policing training.

27. Local confidence in the Transitional Police Force remains low. It is not viewed as a credible, trustworthy police force by Serbs who remain or by Croats who will return. While the standard of basic police work of the Transitional Police Force is acceptable, it has shown reluctance to take effective action

against violent offenders. It is also often hesitant to respond effectively to crimes with possible ethnic overtones, including offences committed by Croatian police from outside the region. Following strong action by the United Nations civilian police component, the level of Transitional Police Force involvement in acts of harassment and intimidation is dropping.

Bilateral issues

28. Continued progress has been made in normalization of relations between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Cross-border rail traffic resumed on 11 November, but the implementation of the "soft border" agreement was postponed to 1 December when it became clear that neither Government was ready for full implementation. The agreement will require substantial administrative flexibility and cooperation. It appears that many bona fide local residents are ineligible for border passes, several municipalities inside the UNTAES region are not included and both parties are charging prohibitive administrative fees. In meetings with the Transitional Administrator, President Slobodan Milošević has proposed several cross-border confidence-building measures. It will be up to the Government of Croatia to determine a constructive response in the interests of wider regional stability.

29. Demilitarization of both sides of the Danube has been discussed between the Governments of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia but it appears that neither wishes to sign a formal agreement. President Milošević has informed the Transitional Administrator that there is an informal understanding that neither State will move its present garrisons closer to the border and that no military manoeuvres will take place in the border region. This is yet to be confirmed. Both Presidents have told the Transitional Administrator that neither side has anything to fear relative to the other's military intentions. No progress has been made on dual Yugoslav citizenship for Serbs in the region, which is now acknowledged to be a domestic issue for the Federal Republic.

III. UNITED NATIONS CIVILIAN POLICE

30. The United Nations Civilian Police component will remain within its authorized strength of 400 until 15 January 1998 in order to continue to monitor all Transitional Police Force operations, including the special operations unit, the river patrol unit and the control of checkpoints and border crossings, as well as conducting patrols throughout the region, special investigations and court and prison monitoring (see annex II).

IV. MILITARY DRAWDOWN

31. A military liquidation force of 720 all ranks, responsible for ensuring the security of drawdown operations and guarding the remaining UNTAES assets and personnel, has been operational since 15 October 1997. The drawdown of military units has proceeded on schedule, with the last elements of the Belgian and Russian battalions leaving the region on 14 November. The United Nations military observers have assumed greater responsibility for monitoring the security situation in the region since the initiation of the military drawdown.

There have been no security problems associated with the operation (see annex II).

V. OBSERVATIONS

32. As the period of transitional administration envisaged in the Basic Agreement draws to an end, consensus has developed between the Government of Croatia, local Serb leaders and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on two key points: firstly, that UNTAES has successfully achieved the basic objectives for which it was established and has completed those tasks which were within its power; and secondly, although much has been achieved by the parties, full implementation of Croatian commitments remains incomplete. Since October, the Government of Croatia has made a major effort to meet those commitments and to reassure its citizens. The performance of the past two months should be the baseline from which additional efforts are made.

33. These efforts, if sustained, give hope that the termination of UNTAES on 15 January 1998 would not jeopardize the results of two years of intensive international investment and effort in the region. In the final analysis, it is the Croatian authorities that are responsible for the successful completion of peaceful reintegration of the region and the true reconciliation of the people. However, two essential conditions for the achievement of the long-term goals established by the Security Council should be emphasized. The first is the complete and unreserved commitment of the Government of Croatia to the permanent reintegration of its Serb citizens. I am particularly encouraged that a comprehensive programme of national reconciliation has been adopted as a State priority and that President Tudjman has guaranteed that the programme will continue after UNTAES. The second condition is that the international community, and particularly Croatia's key bilateral partners and regional organizations, must continue to scrutinize Croatian performance closely and to make their voices heard whenever performance does not meet expectations.

34. In this regard, the immediate priorities of the Government of Croatia for the coming winter must include the extension of national social welfare into the region to avert grave humanitarian difficulties for vulnerable groups; completion of the reintegration of health facilities and personnel; resolution of the substantial difficulties in the education sector as a whole; improvement of the conditions for return of all displaced persons in conditions of safety, economic security and personal dignity; completion of the establishment of fully functioning local government; and cessation of back-tracking on its commitment to defer conscription for two years for Serbs from the region.

35. In the vital area of local policing and the rule of law, the Government of Croatia acknowledges that the Transitional Police Force has not yet demonstrated the professional qualities or inter-ethnic cohesion necessary to police the multi-ethnic communities of the region effectively and impartially. As practical evidence of Croatia's commitment to make reintegration work, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Croatia, Dr. Mate Granić, wrote to me on 6 November to request the continued presence of United Nations civilian police in the Danube region of Croatia following the end of the UNTAES mandate. This initiative is a positive indication that the

Government of Croatia accepts its responsibilities for non-discriminatory policing in the post-UNTAES period. The presence of United Nations civilian police will also provide essential reassurance during the period of major two-way population movement, which is expected to continue until the commencement of the new school year in September 1998.

36. In the post-UNTAES period, many other international organizations will support Croatia by comprehensively monitoring implementation of commitments and providing reassurance to the population of the region. Local Serbs need reassurance and do not yet trust that central government instructions and intentions will be implemented by all local officials. The probability of incidents in the post-UNTAES period is recognized by all parties and cannot be discounted. Without continued international engagement, there is a clear risk that the termination of UNTAES might be seen in retrospect as having been premature. In this connection, I welcome the deployment throughout Croatia of the long-term mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the increasing involvement of the Commission envisaged under paragraph 11 of the Basic Agreement and the activities of local and international non-governmental organizations. The ongoing presence and support of UNHCR will also be an essential part of the continued involvement of the international community.

37. Weighing these considerations carefully, and mindful of the cost to the international community to maintain UNTAES, in particular when its primary functions have been fulfilled, I am of the view that UNTAES should complete its work as originally envisaged. I therefore recommend the termination of UNTAES on 15 January 1998. Until that date, the Transitional Administrator will progressively turn over to the Government of Croatia operational control of all remaining functions in the region, while retaining his authority to intervene and overrule.

38. I further recommend that the Security Council establish a support group of 180 civilian police monitors whose task would be to continue to monitor the performance of the Croatian police in the Danube region, particularly in connection with the return of displaced persons. This would include monitoring investigations by the Croatian police of any allegations of police misconduct in connection with the return of displaced persons to the region and the provision of limited on-the-job training to improve the professional capability of the local police. The Government of Croatia has indicated its readiness to provide such a support group with the necessary protection, should the need arise (see S/1997/913, annex).

39. The civilian police monitors would be stationed in the main Croatian police headquarters and the 20 Croatian police stations throughout the Danube region and would maintain a 24-hour-a-day coverage of police activities. Three joint mobile patrols would also be established in the region. The headquarters of the support group would be in Vukovar and would operate under the overall responsibility of a small substantive unit based in Zagreb. Its operations would be limited to a period of up to nine months, with the option of terminating it sooner should circumstances so permit. The substantive unit based in Zagreb would be the focus for contacts and liaison with officials of the Government of Croatia on issues relating to the support group. It would

also maintain liaison with OSCE, with a view to facilitating, in due course, a smooth transfer of responsibility to that Organization. In order to avoid establishing new administrative structures, I would appoint a senior United Nations official to head both the support group and the United Nations Liaison Office in Zagreb. The Liaison Office would, however, retain its separate functions, as outlined in my predecessor's report to the Security Council of 6 February 1996 (S/1996/83, para. 24).

40. An addendum on the financial aspects of the above recommendation will be issued shortly.

41. In conclusion, I should like to pay tribute to the Transitional Administrator, Mr. William G. Walker, for his highly professional and dedicated leadership of the United Nations efforts to promote peace, stability and the strengthening of democracy in the UNTAES area. I also wish to commend the civilian and military personnel of UNTAES for their excellent performance, commitment and service to the international community.

ANNEX I

List of public agreements with continuing validity
as at 27 November 1997

Basic Agreement on the Region (Erdut Agreement), signed on 12 November 1995

Affidavit on the Rights of Public Employees (16-19 December 1996)

Letter dated 13 January 1997 from the Government of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1997/27, annex)

Annex to the Affidavit (14 February 1997)

Law on Convalidation (22 September 1997)

Letter of Agreement by the Croatian Highway Administration (Hrvatske Ceste) (21 March 1997)

Letter of Agreement by Croatian State Radio and Television (Hrvatska Radiotelevizija) (2 April 1997)

Letter of Agreement by the Croatian Post and Telecommunications Administration (Hrvatska Pošta i Telekomunikacije) (9 May 1997)

Letter of Agreement by the Croatian Water Administration (Hrvatske Vode) (22 May 1997)

Agreement by the Croatian Pension Fund on Pension Services (29 May 1997)

Letter of Agreement by Croatian Railways (Hrvatske Željeznice) (6 June 1997)

Agreement by the Ministry of Health on Regional Health Services (6 June 1997)

Letter of Agreement by the Croatian Electricity Company (Hrvatska Elektro Privreda) (22 July 1997)

Letter of Agreement by the Croatian Forestry Commission (Hrvatske Šume) (25 June 1997)

Declaration on Educational Certificates (11 March 1997)

Agreement on the Distribution of Principals' Positions (4 August 1997)

Decision on Curriculum Content (4 August 1997)

Declaration on Minority Education Rights (6 August 1997)

Letter of Agreement by the Ministry of Education (7 August 1997)

Joint Statement on Reintegration of the Tax Department (4 September 1997)

Joint Statement on Reintegration of the Employment System (11 September 1997)

Joint Statement on Reintegration of the Social Welfare System (11 September 1997)

Agreement on Recognition and Handover of Record Books (25 September 1997)

Memorandum of Understanding on Restructuring the Transitional Police Force (undated)

Agreement on the Joint Working Group on Returns (23 April 1997)

Organization of the Joint Council of Municipalities (23 May 1997)

Declaration on Conditions for Judicial Reintegration (30 September 1997)

ANNEX II

Composition and strength of the military and civilian police elements as at 1 December 1997[a]

Nationality	Military				
	Head-quarters	Combat units	Support units	Military observers	Civilian police
Argentina	-	-	-	-	18
Austria	-	-	-	-	11
Bangladesh	-	-	-	8	36
Belgium	25	104	-	4	-
Brazil	-	-	-	6	-
Czech Republic	-	-	25	4	-
Denmark	-	-	-	-	7
Egypt	-	-	-	4	7
Fiji	-	-	-	-	42
Finland	-	-	-	4	13
Ghana	-	-	-	6	-
Indonesia	-	-	-	5	27
Ireland	-	-	-	4	10
Jordan	-	-	-	6	40
Kenya	-	-	-	6	50
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	8
Nepal	-	-	-	2	18
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-
New Zealand	-	-	-	3	-
Nigeria	-	-	-	3	5
Norway	-	-	-	6	19
Pakistan	-	-	-	5	-
Poland	-	21	-	5	7
Russian Federation	13	203	-	6	3
Slovakia	6	-	250	-	-
Sweden	-	-	-	5	10
Switzerland	-	-	-	3	-
Tunisia	-	-	-	-	13
Ukraine	3	76	-	4	17
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	-	-	-	-	-
United States of America	-	-	-	-	27
Total	47	404	275	99	388

[a] Figures may vary owing to rotations.

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S/1997/953/Add.1
17 December 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION FOR EASTERN SLAVONIA, BARANJA AND WESTERN SIRMIUM

Addendum

1. In my report to the Security Council dated 4 December 1997 (S/1997/953) I indicated in paragraph 40 that, an addendum to the report containing the financial aspects of establishing a support group of civilian police monitors to continue to monitor the performance of the Croatian police in the Danube region would be issued shortly.

2. The estimated costs associated with the operation of the civilian police support group for a period of nine months would amount to approximately $17.6 million. This estimate provides for a strength of 180 civilian police, supported by a civilian establishment of 53 international and 165 local personnel.

3. A breakdown of the estimated financial requirements is provided by main category of expenditure, for information purposes, in the annex to the present addendum. Should the Security Council decide to authorize the establishment of a United Nations civilian police support group in Croatia, it would be my intention to recommend to the General Assembly that the costs relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States be credited to a Special Account established for this purpose.

Annex

Estimated cost of the Civilian Police Support Group in Croatia for a period of nine months

		(Thousands of United States dollars)
1.	Military personnel	-
2.	Civilian personnel	12 600
3.	Premises/accommodation	370
4.	Infrastructure repairs	-
5.	Transport operations	1 340
6.	Air operations	-
7.	Naval operations	-
8.	Communications	500
9.	Other equipment	-
10.	Supplies and services	1 550
11.	Election-related supplies and services	-
12.	Public information programmes	30
13.	Training programmes	-
14.	Mine-clearing programmes	-
15.	Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	-
16.	Air and surface freight	100
17.	United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi	-
18.	Support account for peacekeeping operations	-
19.	Staff assessment	1 110
	Total, lines 1-19	17 600

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S/1997/954
4 December 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 DECEMBER 1997 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached letter dated 4 December 1997 which I have received from the Chairman of the International Monitoring Committee established pursuant to the mandate of the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB).

Attached to the letter is the first periodic report of the Member States participating in MISAB, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1136 (1997) of 6 November 1997. I should be grateful if you would bring the letter and its enclosure to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

97-34828 (E) 051297 051297

/...

Annex

[Original: French]

Letter dated 4 December 1997 from the Chairman of the International Monitoring Committee addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the first report, covering the period from 31 October to 4 December 1997, requested by the Security Council in paragraph 7 of its resolution 1136 (1997) concerning the situation in the Central African Republic.

(Signed) Gen. Amadou Toumani TOURÉ
Chairman of the International
Monitoring Committee

Enclosure

First report to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 1136 (1997) concerning the situation in the Central African Republic

(4 December 1997)

INTRODUCTION

1. At its 3829th meeting, the Security Council unanimously adopted its resolution 1136 (1997), which was essentially a continuation of its earlier resolution 1125 (1997). In other words, the Council approved the continued conduct by Member States participating in the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) of the operation in a neutral and impartial way to achieve its objective as set out in paragraph 2 of Council resolution 1125 (1997). The Council requested the Member States participating in MISAB, namely, the International Monitoring Committee to supervise the implementation of the Bangui Agreements, which represents them, to provide periodic reports to the Council at least every month through the Secretary-General.

2. This first report describes developments in the situation in the Central African Republic from 31 October to 4 December 1997.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

3. The International Monitoring Committee to supervise the implementation of the Bangui Agreements, chaired by General Amadou Toumani Touré, is the body that directs the actions of MISAB, since it receives the necessary political guidance directly from the heads of State concerned, and especially from the President of the Gabonese Republic, who is Chairman of the International Mediation Committee.

4. The International Monitoring Committee has adopted a plan of action that reflects the gist of the main provisions of the Agreements of 25 January 1997 in the form of a timetable, a significant part of which has already been implemented or is currently being implemented.

5. MISAB is under the patronage of President El Hadj Omar Bongo of Gabon, senior head of State of the International Mediation Committee. It is under the political authority of General Touré, Chairman of the International Monitoring Committee.

LOGISTICAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING COMMITTEE

6. It should be noted that since its establishment by the heads of the States members of the International Mediation Committee, the International Monitoring Committee has received logistical and technical support from the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP). The continuation of such support will make it possible to carry out, inter alia, diverse operations, namely:

(a) Political monitoring of the pursuit of disarmament operations in Bangui and later in other parts of the country;

(b) Coordination of activities relating to the organization and conduct of various seminars and conferences provided for in the context of national reconciliation.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO THE MISSION

7. As indicated in the previous reports, MISAB receives logistical support from the participating States, France, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Government of the Central African Republic.

8. While recognizing the generous efforts that the States participating in MISAB, France, OAU and the Government of the Central African Republic continue to make to assist the African contingents based in Bangui, it must be acknowledged that the material conditions of the troops stand in need of improvement, as they are far inferior to those enjoyed by other similar forces operating in other conflict areas. An appropriate solution to this state of affairs should be urgently found in order to avoid demoralization among the troops, which up until now have been endeavouring to carry out their work with selfless dedication.

9. The International Monitoring Committee welcomes the request that the Security Council made to the Secretary-General in its resolution 1136 (1997) to establish a Trust Fund for the Central African Republic that would assist in supporting the troops of States participating in MISAB and in providing logistical support to them. It is important to emphasize that the ability to maintain security in the Central African Republic in a particularly sensitive subregional context will depend on the dispatch with which States Members of the United Nations contribute to the Fund.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BANGUI AGREEMENTS

Provisions already implemented

10. The provisions of the Agreements of 25 January 1997 on the formation of a Government of national union, the adoption of an amnesty law covering offences in the context of the third rebellion and the situation of former heads of State have already been implemented, which is to be commended.

11. The text of the law on the material benefits to be provided to former Presidents of the Republic was adopted on 30 October 1997 by an overwhelming majority. It now remains for the Head of State to issue a decree enacting the law. Under the aforementioned law, "Any former President of the Republic, who was democratically elected and who is currently enjoying his civil rights, shall receive a pension the sum of which shall be equivalent to half of the salary of

the President of the Republic". It should be noted that the persons concerned shall also receive a number of material benefits and special consideration with respect to protocol and security, which will enable them to maintain a standard of living in keeping with the high office that they previously held.

Suspension of the parliamentary audit

12. The bill on the abandonment of the judicial enforcement of the parliamentary audit has not yet been able to be adopted following the intense debate on the subject that took place in November. This first bill was rejected by a majority of deputies. Currently, the Presidency of the Republic and the Government are redrafting the bill for submission to the National Assembly for a second reading. This resubmission will be preceded by an awareness campaign among members of Parliament. It should be noted that the adoption of the bill is an important point of the Bangui Agreements. It will, for all intents and purposes, be resubmitted for a second reading, unless the Head of State decides otherwise.

Disarmament

13. As indicated in paragraph 11 of the previous report (S/1997/828), a coordination and security meeting took place on 5 November under the chairmanship of Colonel Alioune Ibaba, Coordinator of the International Monitoring Committee, with the participation of the Minister of State for Territorial Administration, responsible for Public Safety and Disarmament, members of the Committee, the command of MISAB as well as the principal officials responsible for various national defence and security services. The meeting made it possible to define a strategy to guide the activities to be carried out in the field in order to recover the remaining arms in good condition. Implementation of the strategy began on 10 November.

14. On the basis of apparently reliable information, the security forces (National Gendarmerie and Central African Police Force) are conducting searches in various neighbourhoods while covered by elements of the Central African Armed Forces, themselves protected by elements of MISAB. Although all the searches conducted to date have yielded no results, it can not yet be said that those to be organized - perhaps with a little more precision - will be useless. In other words, the various participants in these operations have not yet given up and are seeking to refine their methods in order to achieve their objectives. It should be noted that the lack of success in this new phase of disarmament has given rise to suspicion and frustration among certain opposition political parties.

15. Since the signing of the truce agreement of 28 June 1997 and the ceasefire agreement of 2 July 1997, the following weapons have been turned over to MISAB:

Heavy weapons

Designation	Quantity	Increase (12 November-2 December 1997)
120 mm mortars	surrendered: 2 out of a total of 4	
81 mm mortars	surrendered: 13 out of a total of 15	
60 mm mortars	surrendered: 14 out of a total of 19	1
14.5 mm machine-guns	surrendered: 6 out of a total of 6	
12.7 mm machine-guns	surrendered: 2 out of a total of 3	1
75 mm recoilless guns	surrendered: 2 out of a total of 2	
73 mm anti-tank rocket launchers	surrendered: 66 out of a total of 67	
Rocket-propelled grenades	surrendered: 7 out of a total of 11	
Total	surrendered: 112 out of a total of 127	
	(weapons recovered: 88.18 per cent)	0.78 per cent

Light weapons

Designation	Quantity	Increase (12 November-2 December 1997)
Hand-guns (misc.)	surrendered: 16 out of a total of 111	
Submachine-guns	surrendered: 299 out of a total of 459	
Assault rifles	surrendered: 261 out of a total of 541	2
MAS 36-49/56-M14 rifles + muskets	surrendered: 651 out of a total of 1,181	2
Light machine-guns	surrendered: 52 out of a total of 80	
.30-calibre machine-guns	surrendered: 15 out of a total of 17	
Total	surrendered: 1,302 out of a total of 2,389	4
	(weapons recovered: 54.49 per cent)	0.16 per cent

16. In the light of the various factors listed in paragraph 13 of the previous report, it is easy to understand why the recovery of all light arms remains uncertain in spite of all the resources brought to bear and the strategies employed.

17. The status of munitions and explosives recovered and packaged as at 2 December 1997 is set out below:

Designation	Quantity	Remarks
5.56 mm rounds	69 085	+1
7.5 mm SLC rounds	14 000	
7.5 mm S/B rounds	123 954	+6 621
7.5 mm X rounds	34 075	+75
7.5 mm X S/B rounds	135	
7.62 mm rounds, NATO	15 962	
7.62 mm Kalashnikov rounds	40 955	+295
7.62 mm long rounds	121 261	+1
7.62 mm Tokarev rounds	2 810	+1 910
9 mm Para rounds	5 523	+117
.12-calibre riot control rounds	731	+3
12.7 mm rounds	2 200	+1 472
14.5 mm rounds	15 434	+112
37 fragmentation hand grenades	1 857	+6
Fragmentation hand grenades, China	3 165	+17
GR FLG AP34	16	+13
RPG 7 rockets	1 151	+11
73 anti-tank rocket launchers	6	+6
.37 stun hand grenades	1 046	+3
FL LAC F4 hand grenades	1 304	+4
F4 hand grenades	316	
Russian grenades	1	
60 mm mortars	1 713	+8
81 mm mortars	852	+18
120 mm mortars	113	+11
75 mm recoilless rifle rounds, US	168	+2
75 mm recoilless rifle rounds, China	223	No weapons in inventory
M79 40 mm rounds, US	6 060	No weapons in inventory
Time fuses (inactive)	2 325	
7.5 mm grenade cartridges	755	
Pyro detonator	6 100	+6 100

Total:

Various rounds	446 880
Explosives and detonators	26 416

Recommendations from the General Meeting on National Defence

18. This provision of the Bangui Agreements remains a kind of apple of discord between those in power and the opposition. Indeed, although everyone is in agreement in recognizing that the rational and consistent implementation of the 282 recommendations from the General Meeting on National Defence can and should form the basis for the solution of many problems facing the Central African Armed Forces, it has proved difficult to find common ground for their implementation.

19. Of all the recommendations, two or three hold the attention of all political circles. These are the recommendations concerning the dissolution of the Centre national de recherche et d'investigation (National Research and Investigation Centre) (CNRI) and the Section d'enquête, de recherche et de la documentation (Survey, Research and Documentation Section (SERD) and that relating to the reduction of the staff of the Presidential Guard. These recommendations touch on sensitive areas in which it is at present difficult to find a modus vivendi between the head of State, supported by the political parties of the presidential majority, on the one hand, and those in the Group of Eleven, on the other. The International Monitoring Committee is very much aware of this situation. The restructuring of the Central African Armed Forces, the National Gendarmerie and the Central African Police Force, as advocated in a number of recommendations, appears to be the key to the response to be given to those recommendations. The implementation of the demobilization, retraining and reintegration project would to some extent promote a move in that direction.

National reconciliation

20. This is the culmination of the long but exciting process of the implementation of the Bangui Agreements. As indicated in the previous reports, this phase is in itself a delicate process in view of the fact that its ultimate aim is to exert a positive influence on the individual and collective psychology of brothers who have had to confront each other and to maintain, or even cultivate, a climate of general distrust from the outset of the crisis. In practice it has fallen to the International Monitoring Committee, and more particularly to its Chairman, General Amadou Toumani Touré, to carry out the twofold task of managing and then eliminating this climate, hence the need to take a number of actions envisaged in the spirit of the Bangui Agreements with a view to restoring the climate of harmony and concord which prevailed in the Central African Republic at the time of the revered patriot, Barthélémy Boganda.

21. Thanks to the logistical, financial and technical support of UNDP, the International Monitoring Committee and the Ministry of Human Rights, National Reconciliation and Democratic Culture have organized awareness-raising seminars in various regions of the country between 18 November and 10 December 1997.

22. Thus, three teams, each composed of deputies, local elected officials, representatives of the Ministry of the Interior and of the Ministry of National Reconciliation, together with resource people designated by the International

Monitoring Committee, have led, and are leading, seminars on peace, unity and national reconciliation:

at Bambari (for the central region of the country),

at Bossangoa (for the north-west),

at Bangassou (for the south-east),

at Berbérati (for the south-west),

at M'Balki (for the south),

at Kaga Bandoro and Sibut (for the centre-north),

at Ndélé and Birao (for the north).

23. The systematic coverage of the country has made it possible to reach within a reasonable period of time all the populations of the country. The same messages have been brought to them and rich in-depth discussion meetings have been held on the need to achieve peace and national reconciliation, conditions conducive to the economic recovery and sustainable development of the country. The conclusions reached at these various seminars will provide a data bank to be made available to the participants in the National Reconciliation Conference which could be held in January 1998.

24. With regard to the National Reconciliation Conference, a preparatory committee was established on 17 October 1997, composed of 40 members representing the public authorities (the Presidency of the Republic, the Government, the National Assembly and the judicial authorities), the parties of the four major political groups, trade unions, employers, the various professions (lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, architects, notaries), religious denominations and women. The Preparatory Committee for the National Reconciliation Conference, presided over by the Minister for Human Rights, National Reconciliation and Democratic Culture, is responsible for:

(a) Preparing the draft rules of procedure and the provisional agenda for the Conference;

(b) Establishing the criteria for the representation of national entities and quotas for participation;

(c) Assembling all the necessary documentation for the preparation and smooth functioning of the work of the Conference.

COOPERATION WITH THE CENTRAL AFRICAN AUTHORITIES AND THE VARIOUS GROUPS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

25. General Amadou Toumani Touré, Chairman of the International Monitoring Committee, returned to Bangui on 21 November 1997 after a consultative mission to the various heads of State of countries participating in MISAB. Since his return, at the head of the International Monitoring Committee, he has resumed various contacts with the highest authorities of the Central African Republic (the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the President of the

National Assembly), the former heads of State (Presidents Dacko and Kolingba), the leaders of the various political groups and a number of individuals. These meetings were of assistance in, inter alia:

(a) The evaluation of the progress made in the implementation of the Bangui Agreements;

(b) The search for solutions to those provisions which have not yet been implemented or those which are being implemented at a slow pace;

(c) The study of the various possible hypotheses during the post-MISAB period, in other words after 6 February 1998, the date on which the mandate authorized by the Security Council in resolution 1136 (1997) expires;

(d) The joint search for ways and means of finding a solution to the thorny problem of arrears of wages and salaries;

(e) The study of the elements of the strategy to be adopted to convince the international community of the need to provide direct and effective assistance to the Central African Republic by organizing a round table of donors to be held during the first quarter of 1998.

COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

26. Pursuant to the Security Council's request to the Secretary-General in resolution 1136 (1997) to provide a report within three months on the implementation of that resolution, the arrival of a multidisciplinary mission from the United Nations Secretariat to collect the elements necessary for the preparation of the report was announced. The International Monitoring Committee will follow the work of this mission with great interest.

27. The talks which Mr. Pierre Etienne Ly, Resident Coordinator for the United Nations, had with various leaders at Headquarters at the beginning of November, together with the working meetings a week later which were coordinated by the Department of Political Affairs and in which Ambassador René Valéry Mongbe participated, enabled the United Nations Secretariat to draw up the terms of reference for the multidisciplinary mission, after receiving the expert advice of General Amadou Toumani Touré.

28. The adoption by the Security Council on 6 November 1997 of resolution 1136 (1997), in which the Council approved the extension of the mandate of MISAB for a period of three months, in other words until 6 February 1998, was a source of satisfaction both to the Central African authorities and to all political circles in the country. The latter have indicated their wish to have the protection of a force of one kind or another until the 1999 presidential elections in order to see the whole electoral process take place in an atmosphere of peace, calm, freedom and transparency. The populations, for their part, are feeling more and more secure now that the spectre of the afflictions, horrors and difficulties of all kinds is definitely receding. Like resolution 1125 (1997), therefore, the new resolution has been seen as having a sort of

catalytic effect on the work of the International Monitoring Committee and MISAB.

29. The International Monitoring Committee and MISAB also welcome the adoption of resolution 1136 (1997) and:

(a) Reaffirm their readiness to work with the Central African people in consolidating the peace which has been restored;

(b) Express the fervent hope that the international community will respond positively and within a reasonable period of time to the invitation by the Security Council in paragraph 6 of the resolution to contribute to the Trust Fund for the Central African Republic which the Secretary-General has been requested to establish;

(c) Hope that paragraph 9 of the resolution, in which the Security Council urges all States, international organizations and financial institutions to assist in post-conflict development in the Central African Republic, will be implemented since, here as in other countries which have encountered the same difficulties, there can be no genuine and lasting peace without a minimum of economic and social development.

30. Moreover, despite the excellent results obtained in agricultural production (in both cash crops and food crops), the Central African Republic, where industrial and commercial activities have clearly been in a state of paralysis for several months, is still experiencing difficulties in meeting its internal obligations (wages and salaries, pensions, scholarships, the functioning of the State apparatus) and its external commitments, in particular the repayment of arrears due to the Bretton Woods institutions.

31. It took an exceptional decision by the head of State and strong action by the Government to constrain those responsible for the major enterprises to discharge some of their arrears and this made it possible for one month's wages and salaries to be paid on 28 and 29 November and then on 2 and 3 December 1997. Moreover, the thorny problem of arrears of wages and salaries, pensions and scholarships provides a reason for the strike which is still taking place in certain sectors, such as higher education. The greatest concern of the Central African authorities is therefore to find the necessary resources to resolve this problem of six months' arrears of wages, salaries and other payments. The official demonstrations planned in celebration of the National Day on 1 December 1997 were cancelled for reasons of economy.

DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE

32. There has been no significant change in the arrangements made since the submission of the previous report. MISAB is continuing to ensure security in all neighbourhoods of the Central African capital by occupying 20 surveillance posts and is participating in joint security patrols in conjunction with the Central African security and defence forces in all districts of Bangui.

33. Hold-ups, armed robberies and other criminal acts have become very rare thanks both to the progress achieved in disarmament and the constant vigilance instituted by the system of joint patrols. It is worth repeating that the image of Bangui as a peaceful city has been restored.

CONCLUSIONS

34. The Security Council's approval of the extension of the mandate of MISAB until 6 February 1998 has given a new impetus to the mediation efforts, in so far as it will to a large extent help MISAB to continue to ensure security and to complete its peace-building mission.

35. The success of the deployment of MISAB will depend above all on the understanding which the international community demonstrates in practice in the implementation of paragraph 6 of resolution 1136 (1997).

36. The International Monitoring Committee hopes to continue to enjoy the logistical and technical support of UNDP in order to pursue its twofold mission of ensuring the political direction of MISAB and monitoring the implementation of the Bangui Agreements through continuing mediation.

37. In order to avoid any slippage or any risk of a return to square one which might lead to social disruption, it is urged that all measures should be taken at the appropriate levels, including the level of the Secretary-General, to arouse a greater awareness among States Members of the United Nations, international organizations and financial institutions with a view to providing the necessary assistance to the development of the Central African Republic, as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 9 of resolution 1136 (1997).

38. A project for the restructuring of the Central African Armed Forces, the National Gendarmerie and the Central African Police Force, taking into account the various recommendations from the General Meeting on National Defence, is being considered by the highest Central African authorities. This project, the preparation and implementation of which are eagerly awaited at the earliest possible date by the whole Central African political community, is strongly supported by the International Monitoring Committee.

39. As it has stated on many occasions, the International Monitoring Committee will continue to spare no effort in urging all the parties to the Central African crisis to continue to work with wisdom and dignity towards the effective implementation of the Bangui Agreements. This is the price of genuine and lasting peace.